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“TEACH ME TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT”: FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE AS
POST-RELIGIOUS VIRTUES
“God is the ‘beyond’ in the midst of our life.”
- Dietrich Bonhoeffer1
“Are you lost, Father?”
“Sorry?”
“Are you lost?”
“No. I suppose not.”
- Darlene Sweet and Father Flynn speaking the first lines of Bad Times at the
El Royale
Classically, philosophers spoke of Courage, Temperance, Prudence, and
Justice as four key or cardinal virtues; following particularly from Christian
scripture, theologians later added to this list the three theological virtues of
Faith, Hope, and Love. According to Thomas Aquinas, what distinguishes
the former four from the latter three is the nature of their object:
teleologically, the cardinal virtues aim at the natural excellence of humans
qua humans, whereas the theological virtues specifically direct us beyond
ourselves to focus on the Divine; as Thomas says, “the object of the
theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing
the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the
intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human
reason.”2
Seven centuries later,  Jacques Derrida famously commented that the
“constancy of God” throughout his life was often “called by other names”
so that he could “quite rightly pass as an atheist” despite conceptualizing
something he considered ultimately meaningful — even quasi-divine.3
Throughout his book The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, John Caputo
meditates upon what Derrida could have meant by this by exploring the
religiosity infused throughout the Derridean corpus, finally framing his
conclusion as a confession: the “sentence I have all along been trying to
write,” says Caputo, in its most impassioned form reads as so: “I do not
know what I love when I love my God.”4
If Thomas is right, then the absence of theistic commitment precludes the
cultivation of genuine faith, hope, and love — any attitudes bearing such
names, without God as their genuine object, are simply pleasant feelings
4 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 332.
3 Jacques Derrida, Circumfession, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), 155.
2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2nd ed, trans. the Fathers of the English
Dominican Province, available online at
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html; I-II, Q62, A2.
1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard
Bethge, trans. Reginald Fuller (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), 124.
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devoid of further significance. Against this, Caputo insists that Derrida’s
faith is real, saying:
When something unforeseeable and unknowable, unpossessable
and impossible drives us mad, when the tout autre becomes the
goal without goal, the object without object, of a dream and a
desire that renounces its own momentum of appropriation, when
the impossible is the object of our love and passion, is that not what
we mean by "my God"? Is that not the name of God? Is that not a
name that we would bend every effort to save, with or without
religion?5
For Caputo, the entirety of his deconstructive project has been motivated to
unveil this religion-less God — this “restless passion” for something greater
than oneself that, whether or not it is divine or even supernatural, offers the
chance of a properly religious response. It grants the faithful person a
standpoint from which the visible horizon of their lives has meaning,
regardless of whether or not some deity might be found beyond that
horizon.
This, I will argue, is the God we see in the cinematic work of Drew
Goddard: not the deity of Thomistic theism, but a God of Derridean passion
for something that transcends ourselves. God might well be dead to
Goddard, but religionless religion can still function to undergird a
meaningful life for those left behind after God’s wake. By focusing
particularly on Goddard’s 2018 thriller Bad Times at the El Royale,6 I aim to
illustrate Caputo’s confession by demonstrating how, even after the death
of God, the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love still remain.
II Religionless Religion in Bad Times at the El Royale
On its face, Bad Times is not a theological film, but a thriller about the chance
meeting of seven (mostly) strangers at an unusual hotel on a stormy night.
Nevertheless, it repeatedly evokes religious themes and is suffused with the
concern for self-transcendence that Dietrich Bonhoeffer described as a
“religionless” approach to piety. God makes no overt appearance in the
narrative, but, following Bonhoeffer in perceiving the Divine’s proper place
being “not on the borders of life, but at its center,” we can recognize in Bad
Times the same “insistence” of existential meaning that unavoidably persists
throughout human experience.7 As Caputo explains:
My entire idea is to reclaim religion as an event of this world, to
reclaim religion for the world and the world for religion. I have not
annulled the religious character of our life but identified its content
and extended its reach, by treating it as a name for the event by
which life is nourished. In so doing we have redescribed and
marked off religion within the boundaries of the world.8
In this way, Bad Times can offer a window into what post-religious
theological virtues might look like, even in a world without God.
8 John Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2013), 247.
7 Bonhoeffer, Prisoner for God, 124.
6 Bad Times at the El Royale, dir. Drew Goddard (20th Century Fox), 2018.
5 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 332.
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Initially, the audience is introduced to most of the characters in the hotel
lobby, split along the state boundary between Nevada and California, but
first impressions are quickly revealed to be untrustworthy when the privacy
of his own room reveals Laramie Seymore Sullivan, the brash and
off-putting vacuum cleaner salesman, to actually be Agent Dwight
Broadbeck, a sensitive father working for the FBI. In speaking with his
daughter on the telephone, Broadbeck’s alteration of a common bedtime
prayer establishes the theological premise of the film: God’s not here, so we
must care for each other.
Typically, the familiar nighttime blessing runs as follows:
“Now I lay me down to sleep / I pray the Lord my soul to keep /
If I should die before I wake / I pray the Lord my soul to take.”
According to Broadbeck‘s daughter, his wife has determined the final
couplet to be “morbid” and therefore replaced it with the lines:
“And when I wake in the morning light / teach me to do what’s
right.”
Although Broadbeck’s later attempt to “do what’s right” ultimately
prevents him from seeing the light of the next morning, this benediction —
and its explicit replacement of divine activity with imperfect human agency
borne from relational ties — underlies each of the virtuous actions
demonstrated in the remainder of the story. The fact that such virtue
remains untethered from God does not diminish its virtuousness.
Broadbeck’s conversation with his daughter is not the only prayer in the
film; in different ways, Father Flynn, Darlene Sweet, Emily Summerspring,
and (especially) Miles Miller each appeal to a higher power at different
points, and — with one possible exception — no answer comes to any of
them from On High. Instead, the psychopathic Billy Lee appears and takes
control of the El Royale, manifesting a downright Nietzschean position of
strength within a world devoid of God. In a flashback scene at a bonfire,
after waxing poetic about moving beyond Right and Wrong, establishing
himself as the leader of the cult-like “family,” and setting up Emily’s sister,
Rose, to fight for her life, Lee makes the assertion that, in his view, “we get
to be our own Gods.” Although Billy is struck down before the credits roll
— at the hands of the genuinely pious Miles, no less — at almost no point
does Goddard suggest that Billy Lee’s sermon is actually incorrect. No clear
deus ex machina appears to rescue the innocent; no Hand of God smites the
wicked with Divine Judgment, no surprise twist leads to a completely
happy ending for “the good guys” — in the end, there is no one innocent,
no one perfectly good, just a jazz singer helping a felon dressed as a priest
flee into the rain with a bag full of stolen money.
Indeed, rather than setting out stark categories of ‘heroes’ and ‘villains,’ the
film constantly complicates introduced dualities, showing how weak
characters like Sullivan and Miles are actually heroic, how innocent players
like Rose are, in truth, murderous, how the security of each hotel room is
undermined by the hidden passageways behind the walls, and how the
seemingly religious figure of Father Flynn is actually a criminal named
Dock O’Kelly. Over the course of the film, the two people most clearly
trying to do the right thing — Broadback and Emily — receive only their
own deaths as payment. In a post-religious world, unmoored from the sort
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of moral grounding that folks like Aquinas took to be necessary for firm
ethical positioning, it might be unclear what constitutes goodness and its
opposite. The very geography of the El Royale satirizes the unfounded
dogmatic commitments to which the faithful might still cling — after all,
only one side of the hotel can sell alcohol — but even this duality burns to
the ground by the movie’s end.
But regardless of what morality amounts to in the world of Bad Times,
whether or not God exists to underwrite it, and even if those with good
intentions are routinely defeated by supermen like Billy Lee, the story is
drenched with the sort of spiritual content that grounds a post-religious
understanding of Faith, Hope, and Love. Though after the death of God,
theological virtues cannot take God as their object, Faith, Hope, and Love
can nevertheless guide us in positive ways even if those virtues are directed
towards other people instead of a divine person; as Caputo says, “If the name
of God is a how, not a what, then the name of God is effective even when it is
not used.”9
So, post-religious theological virtues can remain differentiated from the
cardinal virtues by way of their direction-of-fit (with the cardinal virtues
directed inwardly and the theological virtues directed outwardly), but,
contra Aquinas, the receiving targets of the external virtues do not
ultimately need to be divine, provided that there are humans qua humans
there to stand in God’s place.
III Faith
Consider first the virtue of Faith. To Aquinas, an act of faith is to believe in
God where belief is “to assent to someone of one’s own free will”10 in a
manner that, by definition, cannot be directed towards something false.11
Consequently, faith is a function of an agent’s intellect when that person is
able to apprehend God and admit that God is God. As Eleonore Stump
explains, to Thomas, faith entails forming “an assent to a group of
propositions under the influence of a volition which has the effect of
moving the intellect to an assent it otherwise would not have formed.”12
This sort of chain-of-reasoning that faith constitutes — what Dan
Howard-Snyder has called “objectual faith” or “faith-in-x”13 — amounts to
something relatively simple; as Swinburne puts it, “to have faith in God is
simply to have a belief-that, to believe that God exists.”14 Understandably,
Aquinas is more specific about necessary contextual factors for faith qua
faith to stand (for example: it is interdependent on the third theological
virtue of love for God), but these comments should be sufficient to grasp
the core element of Thomistic faith as a cognitive enterprise grounded in
right judgment of God’s identity.
In contrast, the characters in Bad Times do not come to recognize God for
who God is, but rather they come to see each other for who they truly are. To
different degrees, all seven characters begin their arcs behind a mask; by the
end, the only ones to survive have been forthcoming in their revelation of
14 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 138.
13 Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Does Faith Entail Belief?,” Faith and Philosophy 33, no. 2
(2016): 143, doi: 10.5840/faithphil201633059.
12 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 361.
11 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q4, A5.
10 Summa Theologica, I-II, Q65, A4.
9 John Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), 138.
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their true identities. The most extreme masks are the alter-egos adopted by
Broadbeck (Sullivan) and O’Kelly (Flynn), who go so far as to take on new
names, professions, and histories to complete their charade. While Emily’s
profane signature in the hotel guest book might be loosely read as a
humorous example of this, her mask is one of explicit ambiguity insofar as
her desire to keep her brainwashed sister safe leads her to hide her true
intentions and identity. Miles’ mask is similar to this, though not of his own
wishes: despite his persistent requests to confess his sins to “Father Flynn”
and reveal the history of violence behind his mild-mannered hotel clerk
mask, it is not until the fiery baptism of the final conflict (by which point,
the buckshot wound on his face has given him a different sort of mask) that
the other characters learn his truth. Appropriately, Rose and Billy Lee’s
masks come as a pair: she appears to be an innocent child, he seems to be an
attractive charmer, but both turn out to be cruel sadists by the end (and,
particularly for Billy Lee, those masks are marred by the violence of the
final fight). And though Darlene Sweet is certainly the most honest
character of the bunch, even she reveals herself to be wearing a wig at the
start, removing it only after making her pact with O’Kelly and attempting
to cover the sound of his crowbar with her song.
In short, then, despite the absence of God in Bad Times, the characters all
come to experience each other in painfully open ways and several even
develop bonds akin to what Ryan Preston-Roedder has described as “faith
in humanity,” insofar as Sweet and O’Kelly (and, for a time, Miles) come to
genuinely depend on and believe the best about each other in a manner that
fosters solidarity in the face of the villainous Billy Lee. In particular, Miles’
(and Sweet’s) faith in O’Kelly-as-Flynn offers the most important moment
in the film’s theological trajectory, something that will be discussed in
Section VI after an analysis of the film’s retreatment of love.
For Howard-Snyder, this sort of Thomistic objectual faith consists in Sweet’s
and O’Kelly’s disposition to rely on each other, but, naturally, this faith
category is fully coherent without recourse to a divine object.15 Like
Aquinas, Preston-Roedder is clear that proper faith has both a cognitive and
a volitional element, but — unlike Thomas — Preston-Roedder explicitly
identifies human beings as the proper object of such attitudes.16 Similarly,
just as with Aquinas, Preston-Roedder’s secular faith is reliant upon
something like “love for the other;” as he explains, “the relation of
dependence between caring about people and seeing them in a favorable
light runs in both directions; that is, our concern for our loved ones focuses
our attention and shapes our behavior in ways that make us more apt to see
what is admirable about them, and seeing what is admirable, in turn,
reinforces our concern.”17
Of course, faith in humanity can turn out to be misplaced; in Bad Times,
Emily’s faith in her sister, Rose, turns out to be tragically unfounded (in a
manner roughly in line with Preston-Roedder’s cautionary characterization
of faith’s riskiness), but when faith is able to take root in a relationship
untainted by the manipulations of a character like Billy Lee, it promotes the
betterment of everyone involved. That is to say, this secular faith seems to
qualify as virtuous.
17 Ryan Preston-Roedder, “Three Varieties of Faith,” Philosophical Topics 46, no. 1
(2018): 185, doi: 10.5840/philtopics201846110.
16 Ryan Preston-Roedder, “Faith in Humanity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 87, no. 3 (2013): 666, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12024.
15 Howard-Snyder, “Does Faith Entail Belief?,” 144.
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IV Hope
What, then, of hope? For Thomas, “the object of hope is a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain,” so, because through God all things are
possible, Thomas concludes that “our hope attains God Himself, on Whose
help it leans.”18 The positive feelings of hopefulness for mundane things are
useful passions that motivate action, but Thomas denies that these
sensations - however similar - are equal to hope qua hope in God; only those
“movements of the appetitive faculty” which have their end in God qualify,
on Thomas’ view, as the theological virtue of hope.
Bad Times subverts this treatment of hope in at least two ways: one explicit
and one more subtle. The first is embodied in the character of Miles, whose
persistent hopefulness to seek absolution through Father Flynn subtends
much of his narratival arc. Even on a Thomistic conception of hope, Miles’
anticipation of the possibility to receive forgiveness might qualify as proper
hope, were it not for the consummation of this hope in the fiction of Flynn’s
false identity. This, however, seems odd; the fact that O’Kelly is not a
member of the clergy should have little effect on whether or not Miles’
hopes were satisfied before his death; this is a puzzle that Aquinas cannot
seem to solve (without distending Miles’ experience down to merely a false
belief — that is, Aquinas would have to say that Miles died under a
delusion).
In contrast, the perceptual model of hope proposed by Michael Milona and
Katie Stockdale argues simply that “hope involves a perception of practical
reasons” that an agent possesses.19 In addition to desiring an outcome and
believing said outcome to be possible, the perceptual model says that the
hopeful person sees “the possible-but-uncertain desired outcome as
encouraging to varying degrees” in a manner that happens to provoke
hopeful feelings.20 Accordingly, those hopeful feelings are simply a
perception of the encouraging nature of one’s practical reasons for action —
not necessarily the likelihood of those reasons genuinely obtaining or even
the nature of the thing being hoped for; instead of proper hope needing to
target the good simpliciter (or even needing to target a good-for the hoper),
the perceptual model assesses the propriety of hopeful attitudes simply by
reference to their fittingness to contexts.21 This treatment of hope as an
emotion allows Stockdale to discuss the sort of fearful hopes that arise from
powerful experiences of danger that appear unlikely to end.22 Altogether,
such a model of hope shifts the axis of concern once again away from a
necessarily divine target to land instead on a coherent model focused fully
on human relationships. Given the shape and size of Miles’ attitudes
regarding his past, he has plenty of reasons to seek assistance in the form of
O’Kelly-as-Flynn, even once he becomes cognizant of O’Kelly’s ecclesial
inability to actually offer absolution; nevertheless, Miles’ hope persists
because his practical reasons persist.
22 Katie Stockdale, “Emotional Hope,” in The Moral Psychology of Hope, eds. Claudia
Blöser and Titus Stahl (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), 122.
21 Milona and Stockdale, “A Perceptual Theory of Hope,” 214.
20 Milona and Stockdale, “A Perceptual Theory of Hope,” 211.
19 Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale, “A Perceptual Theory of Hope,” Ergo 5, no. 8
(2018): 219, doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.008.
18 Summa Theologica II-II, Q17, A1.
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On a more subtle note, Miles’ repetitious recitation of the hotel’s welcoming
speech in his introductory scene indicates that, while California is the land
of “warmth and sunshine,” the great state of Nevada is one of “hope and
opportunity.” O’Kelly’s brother buried the stolen money — the movie’s
Macguffin — in Nevada and, with the exception of Broadbeck (who insists
on staying in the honeymoon suite on the California side to collect the
government’s wiretaps), each of the characters — including Miles — are
given rooms in hopeful Nevada. Even at the end, after Miles’ death, Sweet
and O’Kelly escape the burning hotel by leaving through the Nevada door.
Throughout the film, hopefulness as a theme is subtly underscored —
regardless of the absence of the divine as its purported object.
V Love
But, of course, among the theological virtues, “the greatest of these is
love.”23 For Aquinas, the love of God is a “special virtue”24 precisely
because it consists in the loving friendship of humanity for and with the
divine and, more specifically, for the communication of God’s happiness to
humanity.25 As the precondition for true faith and true love — as well as for
all other intellectual and moral virtues — the charity of love as a theological
virtue is the greatest virtue of all, underwriting and preceding each and
every other virtuous habit.26 Aquinas is explicit that this love is distinct
from goodwill, given that the latter is purely an act of will while love qua
love “adds union of affections” to the habit, thereby sanctifying both the
passion and intellect of the lover.27 However, Aquinas is also explicit that,
although God is the proper object of virtuous love, we are also called to love
our neighbor (as well as angels and ourselves) in precisely the same manner
— grounded in what he calls “the fellowship of happiness,” Aquinas
indicates that everything with which we can share in such a relationship
deserves to be shown this kind of love.28
In this way, we have returned to Caputo’s Derridean impassioned
confession of a self-confessed atheist:
To dream, perchance to desire and to love. And what is that dream,
desire, and love if not the love of God, if not the desire for God
("God as the other name of desire")? What is this passion for the
impossible if not the passion for God, for "my God," even if one
were rightly to pass for an atheist?”29
Even in the absence of a transcendent divine, Derrida — and perhaps even
Aquinas — would agree that the fellowship of happiness persists between
us and our neighbors. Even after the death of God, we can — and must —
still love each other.
This Good News lies at the heart of Bad Times as shown in Emily’s love for
her sister, O’Kelly’s love for his brother, Broadbeck’s love for those in need,
and — most profoundly — in the sacrificial love displayed by Miles.
Despite his hatred of his past sins, Miles sets aside himself to rescue the
people in front of him — not because Sweet pleads with him to do so (quite
29 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 332.
28 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q25, A12.
27 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q27, A2.
26 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q23, A6.
25 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q23, A1.
24 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q23, A4.
23 1 Corinthians 13:13.
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pointedly, she does not), but simply because they need to be saved. In
return, O’Kelly (at the imploring of Sweet to “HELP him”) encourages the
dying Miles to confess his sins before it’s too late; standing in the place of
God’s anointed priest, surrounded by the fires of hellish violence, the trio of
humans invoke the name of the Trinity to absolve the faithful penitent
before he dies on the border of good and evil (the Nevada–California state
line). God is nowhere to be found, but the fellowship of happiness between
the survivors persists and prevails; love, if nothing else, does not fail.
VI “Teach Me to Do What’s Right”
Ultimately, Miles’ confession acts as a circumfession of sorts to encompass
the film within the sanctity of two prayers: Broadbeck’s blessing baptizes
the film with a call to “teach me to do what’s right;” Miles’ absolution
demonstrates that the lesson is complete. The absence of God does not free
us from the expectation to care for each other; to the contrary, it in fact
amplifies the weight of our responsibility to do so — if we don’t, then there
is literally no one else who will.
One note remains hanging: a paradoxical thread threatening to unravel this
purely post-religious sketch of the theological virtues; Christina
Gschwandter has said that “God is weeping in [Derrida] and continually
haunts him” — something like this point lingers in Bad Times at the El
Royale.30 Goddard suggests the possibility of a divine presence in the film at
almost no point, but “almost none” is not “none” and two ghostly touches
resound. Recall how “Father Flynn” decided which room to rent at the hotel
in the first place: he flipped a coin and left the rest to chance; one cannot
help but wonder how differently the events of the evening might have gone
had fate tipped that quarter in the opposite direction.
More profoundly, however, is the most ghostly complication of all: just after
Sweet tells Billy Lee she’s “bored” of men like him, and right after O’Kelly’s
forgetfulness happens to re-manifest at the most inopportune moment (at
the end of Billy Lee’s gun barrel), the lightning storm flashes and knocks
out the hotel’s electricity just as Billy Lee calls for Darlene to “pick a color”
in the game that would have led to someone’s death. In the silence of the
power outage, Darlene’s singing sets off the events that culminate in the
climactic gun battle. If there is but one eucatastrophic breath in Bad Times, it
lies within that thunderclap.
Ultimately, Caputo spins the threads of Derrida’s nascent religiosity into a
more comprehensive theological structure than Derrida himself ever did,
arguing that an exploration of Derrida’s différance in explicitly theological
contexts reveals that, “In deconstruction God and a perceptual object do not
differ from each other as the uncertain from the certain, or the fictitious
from the verifiable…[t]he undecidability that befalls our beliefs and
practices in virtue of différance is not the last word, but the first.”31 Bad Times
at the El Royale deconstructs the roles of ‘god’ and ‘human,’ interchanging
them in a way that opens up the theological virtues to remain vibrant, even
in the absence of the religion that might be expected to undergird them. In
this way, it accomplishes the Bonhoefferian notion that  “What is above the
world is, in the Gospel, intended to exist for this world.”32
32 Bonhoeffer, Prisoner for God, 126.
31 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 19.
30 Christina Gschwandtler, Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary
Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 67.
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Put differently: even in a post-religious world, Faith, Hope and Love
remain.33
33 My thanks to Vern Cisney, Jim Stockton, and our audience at the 2020 Central APA
colloquium (hosted by the Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary
Visual Arts) for constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article, as well as to the
participants at the 2019 Gettysburg College Philosophy and Film Seminar where the
core ideas of this paper were born.
382
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory (Fall 2021) 20:3
